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IN THE SUPRE~1E C;QURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GARY G. MORLEY,
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vs.
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STRUCTION C 0 1~1 PAN Y, <cr:tl
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
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Defendants.

DEFENDANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff claims compensation arising out of
an automobile accident that occurred on March 25,
1966. Mr. Morley was a passenger in an automobile
driven by one Linda Johnston. The vehicle was owned
by the applicant; however, he claimed that Morley Construction Co. reimbursed him for mileage and other ex1
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penses (R. 17and18). This matter was originally heard
by the Industrial Commission on April 27, 1967. Subsequent thereto, on August 12, 1968, after the Plaintiff
had moved to reopen, another hearing was held and
Linda J olmston was called by the Plaintiff. The hearing examiner held that the applicant at the time of the
accident in question was not within the course of his
employment.
The hearing examiner held that Mr. Morley had
left the course of his employment after he left Thel's
Lounge with Linda Johnston ( R. 220). At the time of
the applicant's exit from the lounge, he had with him a
bottle of beer and according to his testimony, was taking
Linda home for the purpose of ingratiating himself with
the proprietress of the lounge ( R. 24).
On State Street, the automobile, at approximately
10909 South, veered to the right and then to the left
across four lanes of traffic and struck a tree (R. 81 and
82) . Prior to the accident, the applicant had placed the
beer bottle between his legs arnVt fesult of said accident,
the applicant received the injuries for which he is now
claiming Workmen's Compensation benefits. The applicant described his injuries as follows:
"The injuries I sustained, it busted both of my
legs up, it about cut my left foot off; it tore my
rectum out about so big around (indicating) ;
tore this left cheek all the way from the bone;
cut me on the eye here a little bit; broke my nose.
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I had compound fractures of the right leg." (R.
29).

The Plaintiff in his Statement of Facts fails to
mention that the accident was investigated by Deputy
Sheriff Robert A. Stole. He testified that he had known
Mr. Morley prior to the accident awl on arriving at the
scene observed the applicant's face, and testified that
there was lipstick on his face (R. 70), and that the lipstick matched that worn by Linda Johnston.
As stated earlier, a subsequent hearing was held on
August 12, 1968, where the applicant called Linda
J olmston, the driver of the vehicle ( R. 132) . She
disagreed with the applicant that he had arrived at
Thel' s Lounge about 5 :30. She claimed that he was at
Thel' s Lounge since 3 :00 o'clock and had danced with
her and had bought her a "few drinks" ( R. 153) . She
also stated that the applicant, during the time he was at
the lounge, had been kissing her (R. 172). Another
area of conflict between the applicant and Linda J olmston was the fact that she stated that the applicant insisted that she drive the automobile, whereas the applicant testified that she "just jumped in" and drove the
vehicle (R. 41).
The hearing examiner found that Linda Johnston's
testimony was not to be believed ( R. 220) for the reason
that some alleged perjury charges were to be filed by
the applicant against the witness the Plaintiff had called
to corroborate his story (R. 220).
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In the Findings filed in the matter, the hearing
examiner found that .Mr. Morley at the time of the accident was not within the scope of his employment.
The examiner based his ruling, in part, on the following:

(I) That Mr. Morley was not driving the vehicle
at the time of the accident; and
( 2) The erratic path of the vehicle prior to the
accident; and
( 3) The finding of lipstick on the Plaintiff at the
scene of the accident. As to this finding, the hearing
commissioner found ''that the lipstick on applicant's face
was the product of an exchange between applicant and
the patron. To find that the lipstick was that of persons
unknown and was received without kissing goes beyond
the pale of common sensibility." (R. 113) and found,
therefore, in its Conclusions of Law (R. 114) that "Applicant went off on a frolic of his own, wholly unrelated
to his business."

POINT I.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID
NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE APPLICANT WAS NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF
HIS EMPLOY1\1IENT AT THE TIME OF THE
ACCIDENT.
4
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The following shows that the Industrial Commission had ample evidence to support its Order:
(A) An in;ury which occurs when the claimant is
doing an act for the benefit of a third person is not compensable.

It was agreed that the applicant in this case is part
owner of the Defendant, .l\!Iorley Construction Company, and as such was afforded coverage pursuant to
35-1-43 U.C.A. 1953 as amended. This section allows
coverage by partners and sole proprietors. The law is
clear, however, that a sole proprietor is covered by the
same rules applicable to that of an employee-employer
relationship in determining whether or not an accident
occurred within the scope of one's employment. This
Court has held in Bailey vs. Utah State Industrial Commission, 16 Utah 2d 208, 398 Pac.2d 545, that" ... inasmuch as the legislature has seen fit to include sole proprietors within the compensation coverage, the same
rules of law should be applicable to him as to any other
employee." The applicant proceeded on the theory, by
a self-serving statement, that the reason that he took
Linda from the bar and permitted her to drive his vehicle, was in hopes that he would ingratiate himself to
Thel, proprietress of the lounge, thus enhancing his
chances of getting "a bid," and that he was doing Linda
a favor in driving her home. (R. 24)
It is respectfully submitted that the testimony of
Mr. Morley as to this fact was hindsight and not worthy
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of belief. However, assuming the statement to be accurate, the question presented is whether or not a person
is within the scope of his employment when he goes to
the aid of a third person claiming that he was effectua ting good public relations for his company.
A rather recent Utah case (1964) Rowley vs. Industrial Commission, et al., 15 Utah 2d 330, 392 Pac.2d
1016, negates Plaintiff's theory in this case. A real estate
salesman, working for a development company, went to
a home that was in the process of completion in order to
check the utilities. The Court found that at this point
the claimant was within the course of his employment.
The purchaser of the home had his car stuck in the snow
outside of the home. In the process of walking to the
curb in order to aid the customer, the applicant fell and
sustained his injury. The issue presented was whether
or not the accident which caused his injury arose out of
his employment. The Court stated that the Plaintiff was
in the course of his employment "with a duty to see that
the customers were satisfied with their purchase" and
stated, "it seems clear that he was acting within the
course of his employment in checking the house to see if
all the utilities were working." The Plaintiff, however,
claimed that he was within the course of his employment
by his "helping free the car because he had a duty to
maintain good public relations." The Court denied the
applicant's claim and held as follows:
"We feel this argument without merit since
to say such would provide a basis for any person

6
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injured while voluntarily helping someone, to
claim compensation on the grounds he was maintaining good public relations."
Therefore, even if one was to believe Mr. Morley that
his purpose in allowing Linda to drive the car was for
public relations, this contention does not sustain a finding that he was within the course of his employment.
The case of Rowley vs. Industrial Commission,
supra, sets forth the basic law that once a person acts for
the benefit of the third person, and is injured, he is not
entitled to Workmen's Compensation.
At 99 C.J.S. Section 224, page 751, the following
rule is set forth:
"An injury incurred when the employee has
departed from the service of the master and is
performing a voluntary service for the accommodation of another does not arise out of and in the
course of employment; and even though the employee is performing an act which the employer
permits him to undertake for the benefit of some
other person or for some cause apart from the employer's own interest, the injury does not arise
out of the employment."
( B) At the time the applicant left the tavern there
was a deviation from his employment so that any subsequent activity causing an accident could not be considered within the scope of his employment.

The law appears clear that if one commences on a
business trip, (which is claimed in this case by the claim-

7
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ant in going to Thel' s Lounge in order to make a bid)
and deviates from such purpose and is injured, he is not
within the course of his employment. An early and leading case in the area of workmen's compensation law is
Sullivan v. Industrial Commission, 79 Utah 317, 10 Pac.
2d 924. Sullivan was injured at Poughkeepsie when he
stopped to visit his daughter at Vassar College while on
a company business trip travelling from Salt Lake City
to New York. Sullivan claimed compensation and presented in essence the same theory claimed here - that
is, as a general manager of a railroad company and being away from home, he is within the scope of his agency
while on ~aid trip. He argued that his activities in stopping at Vassar were reasonably incident to his business
trip because it was, of course, necessary that one stop
and rest during the course of such trip. The Supreme
Court held that the applicant was not within the course
of his employment. This case clearly negates the applicant's claim that he is on duty when he is away from
home. Therefore, the mere fact that the claimant was an
occupant of a vehicle that was used for company purposes at the time of the accident is insufficient to sustain
an award for compensation benefits.
The applicant has cited two cases to sustain his position in this regard. They are Stroud vs. Industrial
Commission, 2 Utah 2d 270; 272 Pac. 2d 187, and Twin
Peaks Canning Company vs. Industrial Commission, 57
Utah 589; 196 Pacific 853. It is respectfully submitted
that these cases are of no aid to the applicant in this fact

8
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situation. In both of these cases the accident occurred
while on the premises of the employer. lt is axiomatic
aud has long been held that accidents even caused by
"horseplay" on the premises are compensable. The issue
presented in this case does not, however, concern the
same policy argument that gives rise to the "on the
premise" type of fact situation.
( C) The applicant failed to present sufficient evi-

dence that at the time of the accident he was in the performance of his duties.
It is fundamental that in determining whether one
is within the scope of his employment, the first test is
whether or not the activities of the claimant at the time
of the accident were within his duties for his employer.
The record is void of any evidence which would in any
manner show a connection between the claimant's duties
with Morley Construction Company and allowing Linda
to drive his vehicle. As has been referred to earlier in
Bailey vs. Utah State Industrial Commission supra, the
fact that the applicant is both employer and employee
does not negate the general rules of workmen's compensation. Compensation is only allowed when at the time
of the accident the employee is within the scope of his
duties.

This Court has reviewed in Board of Education of
Logan City, et al vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, ct
al, 102 Utah 504, 132 Pac. 2d 381, the necessary eviden-

9
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tial requirements the claimant must present to sustain a
finding that he was within the course of his employment
when engaged in peripheral activities.
In this case, the Court was presented with a situation wherein the applicant claimed compensation because he was, according to his argument, effectuating
good will which would result to the benefit of his employer. It should be pointed out that in this case the facts
were not as bizarre as in the present case. In the Board
of Education case, supra, the applicant was employed as
a ~chool teacher and one of his duties was the joining of
a recreation council. After making a speech in a surrounding community on "recreation," and when returning home, he was involved in an accident. The applicant
proceeded on the theory that this promotional activity
of giving speeches would create good will for his employer and fell within the scope of his duties and therefore he was covered at the time of the accident. The Supreme Court held that there were insufficient facts to
sustain an award in that there was no evidence that his
duties required him to participate in this outside activity.
Certainly, in the Board of Education case the promoting of activities of recreation inured to the benefit of his
employer, however, the Court ruled that there were no
facts to show that this was his duty.
We submit that this case clearly shows that applicant's theory is invalid, that is, that any activity which in
any manner may benefit the employer is sufficient to

10
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sustain an award. As stated aforesaid, there is no evidence in the record that l\fr. Morley's duties were to
extend rides to third persons and certainly the rather
tenuous position that this actvity could in some manner
be helpful to the employer is insufficient.
In summary, the record is silent that the partnership entity of Morely Construction Company assigned
Mr. Morley the duty of allowing Linda to drive the
company vehicle.
(D) That the deviation in this case involved risks

which were causually related to the accident and as such
the applicant was not within the scope of his employment.
In analyzing deviation cases it appears clear that
when the deviation itself contributes causually to the
risk which caused the accident the Courts are justifiably
reluctant in granting compensation. Therefore, the ap..
plicant' s act of allowing a stranger to drive his vehicle
and the careless act of carrying a bottle of beer between
his legs itself would negate one's claim for compensation.
Larson on Workmen's Compensation Law, Volume I,
page 294.94, Section 19.61, succinctly set forth the rule
applicable in these situations. Larson states:
"If the incidents of the deviation itself are
operative in producing the accident, this in itself
will weigh heavily on the side of non-compensa-
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bility, as in the Conklin case, (312 l\lich. 250, 20
N.VV. 2d 179 ( 1945)) in which the very act of
stopping to see the personal friend caused the
rearend collision of the two trucks, and as the
Colwell case ( 309 S.,V. 2d 350, Ky. 1958) in
which the act of crossing the road to tow a
brother-in-law's car with a coal truck led to the
accident.
Also related to this factor is the argument
used in the Public Service Company case, (395
Ill. 238, 69 N.E. 2d 875 ( 1946)) that by virtue
of the deviation the employee introduced the hazard of having to cross and recross dangerous railroad tracks which were not a hazard of his regular route.
Again, in Stephens vs. Young, ( 115 Ohio App.
13, 184 N.E. 2d 112 (1961)) the causal element
added by the deviation was a new-found friend.
After a few beers at two taverns, a route salesman accepted a ride with the new friend to retrieve a forgotten route book. The tavern acquaintance hit him over the head and stole his
preYious day's collections.
And in Sun Insurance Company vs. Boyd,
( 101 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1958) ) the deviation su-

perimposed uron the employment the clearly unrelated risk of climbing a ladder to retrieve a
hammer from a scaffolding a_t home.
In the prolific category of deviations involving
drinking, the fact that the drinking usually combined with driving, in itself added a notorious
hazard and has undoubtedly been a factor in
some denials of compensation, whether specifically mentioned or not.

12
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Larson also discusses the factual situation where
the employer was mixing pleasure with business. In this
regard Larson on 'V orkmen's Compensation Law sets
forth the appropriate rule at Volume I, page 294.45,
Section 18.41 as follows:
"We have seen the application of the mixedpurpose doctrine of out-of-town trips and to the
journey between the employee's home and job.
The same doctrine is helpful in disentangling
various other problems in which the mixing of
business and pleasure casts doubt on the character of the employee's errand at the time of inJUry.
One such situation is that of the salesman who,
having spent the evening in a tavern, and having
been injured on his way home, testifies that he
tried to sell the bartender a car in the course of
the evening. In two cases of this kind, 'Visconsin
has denied compensation on the ground that carselling was entirely incidental (Price vs. Shorewood ~I otors, Inc., 214 'Vis. 64, 251 N.,V. 244
(1933)) even when the claimant contended that
he had gone somewhat out of his way to make the
call. (Fawcett vs. Gallery, 21 'Vis. 195, 265
N.,V. 667 (1936)). In a comparable situation,
the Wisconsin court rejected a service station
employee's contention that at time of injury,
which was 3 :30 a.m., he was road-checking the
car for his female companion, a night club entertainer who at the time was apparently intoxicated. (Hermans vs. Industrial Commission, 266
'Vis. 100. 62 N.,v. 2d 406 (1954)).
In a Minnesota case, (McCarty vs. Twin City
Egg & Poultry Ass'n., 172 Minn. 551, 216 N.,V.
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239) au employee left his home about 10 :00 at
night with a drunken companion and drove 15

miles to a restaurant, for the purpose, he said, of
seeing the restaurant-keeper on business of his
employer.
The court said :
'That a servant with a fixed salary should of
his own motion start out on work for his employer
after 10 o'clock at night and invite a drunken person as a companion is not the ordinary occurrence. \Vhen, in addition thereto, it is considered
that in the morning relator would necessarily pass
Hugo in going to employer's office for instruction as to the day's work, it seems incredible that
he should have taken a journey some 15 miles
late at night to iuteniew a restaurant keep at
Hugh.'

It may be observed that in these cases, as in
most of the unsuccessful cases, the evidence of
actual perfonnance of a business function is at
best weal-;; and at worst has the distinct earmarks
of an afterthought. \Vhen an insurance salesman,
who had gone on several weekend trips with a
friend to see game-cock fighting, was injured returning from such trip and asserted that he had
discussed insurance with his friend during the
trip, it is difficult, under the rule in Marks vs.
Gray, to conclude that the business trip would
have gone forward although the personal motive had failed." (Emphasis added)

CONCLUSION
The applicant in his brief points out that "at the
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first blush" it appears that "Mr. Morley was in fact on
a frolic of his own, to-wit: having some type of liason or
affair with Linda Johnston. Nothing is further from
the fact or truth. People, being human, are prone to
think the worst of their fellow man and jump to what
they think are valid assumption." 'Vithout making any
imputations it appears safe to say that the claim of applicant for compensation in this case is based upon a
rather bizarre set of facts. The claim that Mr. Morley
was attempting to bring about good will for his business
entity seems somewhat weak. The facts are simple: He
left the lounge with a beer which at the time of the accident was tucked between his legs, with a young girl who
he claimed insisted upon driving, and was involved in
an accident where the path of the automobile was quite
erratic and where the investigating officer noted lipstick
on his face after the accident. It appears therefore that
the Industrial Commission was justified in believing
that the applicant was not within the scope of his employment at the time of accident. It also appears that the
Industrial Commission was not arbitrary and capricious
in its order for the following reasons:
(A) An injury which occurs when the claimant is
doing an act for the benefit of a third person is not compensable.
( B) At the time the applicant left the tavern there
was a deviation from his employment so that any subsequent activity causing an accident could not be con-
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sidered within the scope of his employment.
( C) The applicant failed to present sufficient evidence that at the time of the accident he was in the performance of his duties.
(D) That the deviation in this case involved risks
which were causjally related to the accident and as such
the applicant was not within the scope of his employment.
The Industrial Commission's denial of the award
is sustained by the evidence.

ROBERT D. MOORE
Respectfully submitted,
Attorney for Defendants
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